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Partiality and ImpartialityMorality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World$
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Brian Feltham and John Cottingham

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579952

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001

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I Will If You Will: Leveraged Enhancements and Distributive Justice *

I Will If You Will: Leveraged Enhancements and Distributive Justice *

Chapter:
(p.223) 10 I Will If You Will: Leveraged Enhancements and Distributive Justice*
Source:
Partiality and Impartiality
Author(s):

David Estlund (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0011

Economic equality can easily seem to depend on participants caring more for impartial values such as distributive justice than they are morally required to do. A liberal morality in which partial concerns for the interests of oneself or loved ones are given some scope might seem to permit people to refrain from doing what is impartially best unless they are compensated. The compensation would cancel the prerogative, but would often produce inequality, since the compensated costs are not just the agent's but often others she is close to or cares about. If, instead of reducing the agent's burden with compensation, society enhances the impartial value of the proposed work, her option to refrain might still be cancelled, but this time without producing any inequality. This idea of ‘leveraged enhancement’ has important normative consequences both for personal morality and for the design of social institutions with an eye to distributive justice.

Keywords:   equality, partiality, impartiality, inequality, prerogatives

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