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Partiality and ImpartialityMorality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World$
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Brian Feltham and John Cottingham

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579952

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001

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When Is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?

When Is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?

(p.26) 1 When Is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?
Partiality and Impartiality

Brad Hooker (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins by considering impartiality in the application of moral rules. Bernard Gert's influential conception of impartiality comes under scrutiny. It then discusses when impartial benevolence (act-utilitarianism) is or is not appropriate as the direct guide to decisions about what to do. The final section defends impartial assessment of moral rules and addresses its relation to agent-neutral assessment. Contractualism and rule-consequentialism converge in offering impartial justification for moral rules that accord very considerable scope to partiality.

Keywords:   moral rules, utilitarianism, consequentialism, agent-neutrality

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