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Partiality and ImpartialityMorality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World$
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Brian Feltham and John Cottingham

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579952

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001

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Responsibility within Relations

Responsibility within Relations

(p.150) 7 Responsibility within Relations
Partiality and Impartiality

Stephen Darwall (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Philosophical discussion of relationships of love and friendship has tended to focus on ways in which particularistic forms of care and concern seem to create problems for impartial ethical theories. This chapter explores ways in which regard and respect for one another as equal persons is no less central to love and friendship, and how these are best accounted for within an ethical theory that is grounded within a second-person standpoint. More specifically, it argues that central to loving and friendly relations is a kind of answerability to one another that involves equal respect. Correspondingly, no emotion is more corrosive of relationships than contempt, since it implicitly excludes answerability to the other.

Keywords:   particularism, relationship, responsibility, respect, care

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