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Partiality and ImpartialityMorality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World$
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Brian Feltham and John Cottingham

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579952

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001

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Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases *

Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases *

(p.169) 8 Which Relationships Justify Partiality? General Considerations and Problem Cases*
Partiality and Impartiality

Niko Kolodny

Oxford University Press

Although we have countless interpersonal relationships, we have reason for partiality only in some. Why is this? Why is there reason for friendship and love of family, but not for racism or omertà? This chapter tries to make some progress toward a principled answer by appealing to a neglected phenomenon: resonance. It suggests how resonance might explain why some relationships support partiality while other relationships do not, paying special attention to the case of racism. It concludes with some reflections on the implications of this account for other relationships, such as co-citizenship; for the defence of partiality in general; and for the difficult relations between partiality and other norms, most notably those of impartial morality.

Keywords:   partiality, relationships, friendship, love, racism

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