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Taking Morality SeriouslyA Defense of Robust Realism$
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David Enoch

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579969

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001

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(p.185) 8 Disagreement
Taking Morality Seriously

David Enoch

Oxford University Press

Moral disagreement is widely held to pose a threat for metaethical realism and objectivity. This chapter is an attempt at understanding how it is that moral disagreement is supposed to present a problem for metaethical and meta-normative realism. The chapter distinguishes between many different arguments that are not often as clearly distinguished, and critically evaluates their force against Robust Realism. Such a critical survey reveals that some of the arguments fail rather clearly; others supply with a challenge to realism, but not one we have any reason to believe realism cannot address successfully; yet others beg the question against the realist; and others raise serious objections to realism, but ones that — when carefully stated — can be seen not to be essentially related to moral disagreement, and are thus discussed elsewhere in this book.

Keywords:   moral disagreement, relativism, relativity, method in moral philosophy, internalism, rationally irresolvable disagreement

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