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The Kantian AestheticFrom Knowledge to the Avant-Garde$
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Paul Crowther

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199579976

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579976.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 June 2021

The Universality and Justification of Taste 1

The Universality and Justification of Taste 1

(p.89) 4 The Universality and Justification of Taste1
The Kantian Aesthetic

Paul Crowther (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

For Kant, the judgement of taste (i.e. pure aesthetic judgement considered under the conditions of its justification) can claim validity beyond mere personal preference. However, since it is not grounded in ‘definite’ concepts the validity in question cannot be given a strictly objective justification. The basis of universality and validity is to be sought, rather, in its embodiment of subjective conditions that enable knowledge formation. Kant's proofs of this converge on the relation between imagination and understanding, and on issues bound up with beauty as a symbol of morality. His arguments are scrutinized and weaknesses identified. This chapter offers a revised version of Kant's approach, using a neglected factor in his account of moral life; namely, cultivation based on comparative criteria.

Keywords:   judgement of taste, universality, harmony, beauty, symbol of morality, cultivation

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