In this chapter two possible transcendental readings of Descartes's view on matter are examined. Here, the sense in which matter was taken by Descartes to be the condition underlying the conceivability of empirically real bodies is established. What is more, it is shown how this conception of matter (as an underlying condition of conceivability) applies to mathematical objects, such as numbers and geometrical figures. Appended to this chapter is the final word: ‘Tying Up the Loose Ends—Closing Remarks.’ In this last section, the chapter reflects on the seventeenth‐century answer to the question, ‘Why matter?’, posed at the beginning of the book.
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