This introductory chapter sketches the main themes of the book. These are as follows: Part I concerns the problems and prospects of Kantian anti-sceptical transcendental arguments. Part II concerns the problems and prospects of arguments against scepticism that are driven by semantic externalism (Putnam, Davidson, McDowell are the principal players here). Part III concerns the epistemology of anti-individualism: does this very plausible and influential thesis in the philosophy of mind engender sceptical problems about knowledge of the content of one's own intentional mental states? Part IV concerns fundamental epistemic principles (such as closure of knowledge under known implication) that figure in the now-standard versions of sceptical argumentation. Can the principles be argued for, or are they primitives? What is the most plausible formulation of them?
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