Transcendental Arguments I
Transcendental Arguments I
This chapter begins by considering the aforementioned Stroudian critique of transcendental arguments. Some doubts are raised about whether Stroud has succeeded in giving a fully general argument against the possibility of transcendental arguments. Then Peter Strawson's reconstruction of what he takes to be Kant's anti-sceptical reasoning in the Transcendental Deduction is considered, via the lense of Richard Rorty's reconstruction of Strawson's reconstruction of Kant. What emerges is a ‘conceptual presupposition’ strategy for addressing the sceptic. It is argued that this strategy falls prey to the Stroudian critique.
Keywords: Kant, Stroud, Peter Strawson, Richard Rorty, verificationism, phenomenalism
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