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Essays on Skepticism$
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Anthony Brueckner

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199585861

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.001.0001

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The Structure of the Skeptical Argument

The Structure of the Skeptical Argument

Chapter:
(p.319) 29 The Structure of the Skeptical Argument
Source:
Essays on Skepticism
Author(s):

Anthony Brueckner

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585861.003.0030

This chapter focuses on the question whether the standard closure-based sceptical argument requires the assumption of a second epistemic principle, an ‘underdetermination principle’, which could drive a sceptical argument that does not require closure. The question is raised: Is the underdetermination principle equivalent to closure?

Keywords:   closure, underdetermination, justification, favouring, evidence

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