- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Transcendental Arguments I
- 2 Transcendental Arguments II
- 3 The Anti‐Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism
- 4 Modest Transcendental Arguments
- 5 Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism
- 6 Stroud's “Transcendental Arguments” Reconsidered
- 24 Epistemic Universalizability Principles
- 25 Why Nozick is a Sceptic
- 26 Skepticism and Epistemic Closure
- 27 Unfair to Nozick
- 28 Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism
- 29 The Structure of the Skeptical Argument
- 30 Klein on Closure and Skepticism
- 31 The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism
- 32 Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
- 33 Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson
- 34 Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism
- 35 Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
- 36 ∼K∼SK
- Bibliography
- Index
Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
- Chapter:
- (p.341) 32 Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
- Source:
- Essays on Skepticism
- Author(s):
Anthony Brueckner
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter is a reply to Ted Warfield's claim that you cannot refute closure by showing that some necessary condition for knowledge is not closed.
Keywords: Ted Warfield, necessary condition for knowledge, fallacy of composition, Sosa
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Transcendental Arguments I
- 2 Transcendental Arguments II
- 3 The Anti‐Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of Idealism
- 4 Modest Transcendental Arguments
- 5 Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism
- 6 Stroud's “Transcendental Arguments” Reconsidered
- 24 Epistemic Universalizability Principles
- 25 Why Nozick is a Sceptic
- 26 Skepticism and Epistemic Closure
- 27 Unfair to Nozick
- 28 Problems with the Wright Route to Skepticism
- 29 The Structure of the Skeptical Argument
- 30 Klein on Closure and Skepticism
- 31 The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism
- 32 Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge
- 33 Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson
- 34 Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism
- 35 Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic
- 36 ∼K∼SK
- Bibliography
- Index
