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Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology$
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Tamar Szabó Gendler

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199589760

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 December 2021

The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies

The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies

Chapter:
(p.98) 5 The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies
Source:
Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology
Author(s):

Tamar Szabó Gendler (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0006

This chapter attempts to show that a particular intuition that has played a central role in discussions of epistemology for roughly a quarter‐century is highly unstable. This is the intuition that, in so‐called fake barn cases, the subject does not know that he is seeing a barn. By presenting a range of examples that share the structural features of Alvin Goldman's original fake barn case, but differ from it in terms of their content, the chapter provides grounds for thinking that the fake barn intuition is not one around which a theory of knowledge can aptly be built.

Keywords:   intuition, epistemology, knowledge, philosophical methodology, Alvin Goldman, fake barn case, Gettier case

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