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Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics$
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D. M. Armstrong

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590612

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.001.0001

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(p.54) Chapter 7 Particulars
Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics

David M. Armstrong

Oxford University Press

It is argued that particulars have only a ‘loose and popular’ identity over time (Bishop Butler), ‘perdurantist’ rather than ‘endurantist’. For an unchanging particular we need to go to a four‐dimensional object, a ‘space‐time worm’. Such an object is primarily held together by a causal relation (immanent causation in W.E. Johnson's terminology). Following Russell, an ordinary particular can be described as a ‘causal line’. Particulars are contingent entities.

Keywords:   identity, Bishop Butler, perdurantism, endurantism, immanent causation, W.E. Johnson, causal line, Russell

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