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Epistemic Modality$
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Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199591596

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001

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Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two Space‐ism versus One Space‐ism

Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two Space‐ism versus One Space‐ism

Chapter:
(p.131) 4 Possibilities for Representation and Credence: Two Space‐ism versus One Space‐ism
Source:
Epistemic Modality
Author(s):

Frank Jackson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0005

Many sentences represent the kind of world we inhabit, in the sense of providing putative information about it. For each such sentence, there is a set of possibilities, ways things might be, which are in accord with how things are being represented to be by the sentence, and which are such that the credence we give the sentence's being true is the sum of the credences we give to each of the possibilities being actual. Some say that, in fleshing out this attractive picture, we have to draw on the distinction between what's metaphysically possible and what's conceptually possible. This chapter argues that this is a mistake.

Keywords:   representation, information, metaphysical possibility, conceptual possibility, A-intensions, C-intensions

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