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Crime, Punishment, and ResponsibilityThe Jurisprudence of Antony Duff$
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Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer, and Mark R. Reiff

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199592814

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.001.0001

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Beyond the Justification/Excuse Dichotomy

Beyond the Justification/Excuse Dichotomy

Chapter:
(p.141) 9 Beyond the Justification/Excuse Dichotomy
Source:
Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility
Author(s):

Douglas Husak

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592814.003.0009

This chapter discusses the strain in criminal law theory created by the assumption that all substantive defences — those that entitle a defendant to an acquittal as a matter of justice — can be categorised as either a justification or an excuse. A number of pleas that clearly show a defendant does not deserve to be punished resist simple classification within the traditional defence hierarchy. Antony Duff suggests in Answering for Crime that problems involving putative justification require a new defence — the warranted — to supplement those of justification and excuse. The chapter develops his original idea by examining additional kinds of cases in which further distinctions are helpful.

Keywords:   justification, excuse, defense, putative justification, desert, punishment, liability

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