The Role of an Overlapping Consensus
The Role of an Overlapping Consensus
Critics of political liberalism argue that the appeal to what reasonable people could accept must either confuse mere agreement with justification, or else the appeal to what reasonable people could accept is altogether unnecessary. This chapter responds to these objections. The author argues that there is an important role for the idea of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable persons within the justificatory structure of political liberalism. The view of the overlapping consensus that the author advocates, however, differs significantly from the one offered by Rawls. Because the practice of public justification requires some common ground, the author argues that an overlapping consensus between reasonable people ought to mark the first stage, not the last stage of the justificatory structure of political liberalism. Presenting political liberalism in this way helps avoid objections that political liberalism mistakes agreement for justification, as well as objections that the reference to reasonable persons is superfluous to the project of political justification.
Keywords: congruence, justification, overlapping consensus, political liberalism, public justification, public reason, Rawls, reasonable persons
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
