Truth and Scepticism
Truth and Scepticism
Liberals usually insist that justice must have priority over other values in our practical deliberations, but this insistence seems to pose particular problems for political liberalism given two of its other commitments. The first is the commitment to abstain from appeals to truth in political philosophy. The second is the commitment to avoid scepticism about our capacity to know the good. Critics argue that political liberalism cannot justify the priority of justice without falling foul of at least one of these two commitments. This chapter shows why this objection is misguided, and how political liberalism's criterion of reasonable acceptability can posit the priority of liberal justice while avoiding controversial claims about truth and scepticism.
Keywords: epistemic restraint, Estlund, political liberalism, public justification, Rawls, Raz, scepticism, truth
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