The chapter focuses on qualities of conscious experiences. Dualists take these to be manifestly non-physical, but the previous chapter included an attempt to undermine the ontological significance of the mental–physical distinction. Representationalists argue that what we regard as qualities of conscious experiences are in fact qualities we represent things — objects or properties experienced — as having; experiences themselves are, as Moore put it, ‘diaphanous’. The idea that, although representationalism is largely correct, experiences themselves have a qualitative ‘aura’ is illustrated by reference to the kind of prosthetic vision afforded by the TVSS and defended in a way meant to preserve the idea that the deep story about truthmakers for truths about the mind is to be found in fundamental physics.
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