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Objectivity and the Parochial$
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Charles Travis

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199596218

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596218.001.0001

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Truth and Merit

Truth and Merit

(p.229) 8 Truth and Merit
Objectivity and the Parochial

Charles Travis (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter compares Frege and Austin on truth. One might think that these thinkers held opposing views on truth. But, at least for the most part, there is no reason to think this. It is better, it is argued, to see them as holding complementary views, shaped by different overarching interests. Austin's picture of truth is one which fits the case of concrete speech acts naturally, and which captures important aspects of truth which would otherwise be neglected. For example, it makes clear the shortcomings of deflationisms about truth. Frege's view fits naturally where truth's central application is seen as judgements. The one place where there might be disagreement between these two thinkers is in some remarks of Frege's about the failure of logic (or any precise theory) to apply to what he calls ‘pseudo-conceptual constructions’. But even here, it is argued, there is less than clear disagreement.

Keywords:   Austin, Frege, truth, definability of truth, correspondence, speech acts, thoughts as invisible and intangible

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