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The EU's Decision TrapsComparing Policies$
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Gerda Falkner

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199596225

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 October 2021

Escaping Joint-Decision Traps

Escaping Joint-Decision Traps

National and Supranational Experiences Compared

Chapter:
(p.199) 12 Escaping Joint-Decision Traps
Source:
The EU's Decision Traps
Author(s):

Arthur Benz

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.003.0012

This chapter compares multilevel governance in the EU and in federal systems of nation states. While federal states use a variety of modes of intergovernmental coordination of policies, patterns of joint-decision making can be found most often when constitutions are amended. A comparative analysis of selected cases of constitutional reform reveals that institutional change is facilitated by an appropriate design of negotiations. Under particular conditions, constitutional policy provides an escape from the joint-decision trap. In the EU, the Convention process indicates a new arena for constitutional negotiations that support a successful reform of decision rules. However, this approach, as well as the simplified procedure in the Intergovernmental Conference, comes to its limits if powers for particular policies are to be changed by Treaty amendment.

Keywords:   constitutional policy, Convention, federal state, intergovernmental coordination, multilevel governance, negotiation, Treaty amendment

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