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Act and CrimeThe Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law$
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Michael S. Moore

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599509

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599509.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 March 2021

Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Notions of ‘Sameness’ of Action-Types

Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Notions of ‘Sameness’ of Action-Types

(p.325) 13 Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Notions of ‘Sameness’ of Action-Types
Act and Crime

Michael S. Moore (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter takes up the first of the two ‘sameness’ questions distinguished in the last chapter. This is the question of whether an accused can be punished separately for two (or more) offenses when a single act by him instantiates both (or all) such offenses. Multiple punishments are banned when the offenses are ‘the same.’ A ‘wrong-relative’ test is proposed for deciding upon the legal sameness of offenses. Such a test does not demand that the prohibited act types be fully identical in order to be legally ‘the same offense’, rather, merely partially identical act-types should be legally ‘the same’ when the parts that overlap constitute the same moral wrong, and when the parts that do not overlap do not constitute new and different moral wrongs. The basic idea is that the goal of proportionate punishment (that lies behind the relevant double jeopardy prohibition) demands that we assess the amount of wrongdoing done by an accused's single act, and that to assess this we must be able to count distinct wrongs.

Keywords:   act types, same offense, partial identity, wrong-relative individuation, overlapping statutes

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