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The Philosophy of MetacognitionMental Agency and Self-Awareness$
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Joëlle Proust

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199602162

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602162.001.0001

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(p.1) 1 Introduction
The Philosophy of Metacognition

Joëlle Proust

Oxford University Press

An initial working definition of metacognition is presented that is neutral between the two views (evaluativism versus attributivism) that are discussed throughout the book: metacognition is ‘a set of capacities through which an operational cognitive subsystem is evaluated or represented by another in a context sensitive way’. The various claims in favour of the existence of a procedural form of metacognition, whose function is restricted to evaluating one’s own epistemic/cognitive states, are summarized, and the general motivation of inscribing metacognition within mental agency is explained. A brief summary of the chapters is provided.

Keywords:   Procedural metacognition, cognitive agency, mindreading, self-attribution, control, meta-memory

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