This chapter discusses the existence of non-human primate metacognition. New experimental paradigms and methodological principles emerged to disentangle associative from metacognitive learning. The main results are summarized. Four hypotheses meant to account for the comparative evidence available about animal metacognition are discussed: the belief competition hypothesis claims that the observed performances can be explained in non-metacognitive terms; the mindreading hypothesis claims that metacognitive competence derives from self-directed mindreading. The metarepresentation hypothesis claims that it derives from an ability to use metarepresentations of one’s own mental states. The double accumulator hypothesis claims that the metacognitive capacity in non-humans can be explained by computational mechanisms specialized in extracting dynamic information about the process of cognitive decision. This last hypothesis is found to be both compatible with behavioural and neural evidence, and coherent with the concept of procedural, activity-dependent metacognition.
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