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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3$
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603213

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603213.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 April 2021

Omniprescience and Tough Choices

Omniprescience and Tough Choices

(p.41) 3 Omniprescience and Tough Choices
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3

E. J. Coffman

Oxford University Press

Several philosophers have argued that an omniprescient person could not act in certain ways. This chapter presents and assesses what may be the most promising such argument: the Tough Choices Argument (TCA). The TCA concludes that an omniprescient person could not make a tough choice—i.e., a choice between alternative courses of action in light of knowledge that none is uniquely reasonable. The TCA derives from an argument due to Tomis Kapitan; and the objection to the TCA developed in this chapter superficially resembles a reply to Kapitan's argument due to David Hunt. Along the way, then, the chapter discusses Kapitan's argument, and Hunt's reply, to show how they differ (respectively) from the TCA and the objection to it developed herein.

Keywords:   omniprescience, omniscience, God, deliberation, choice, decision, intentional action, freedom, theism, determinism

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