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Lying, Misleading, and What is SaidAn Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics$
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Jennifer Mather Saul

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603688

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603688.001.0001

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The Problem of What Is Said

The Problem of What Is Said

(p.21) 2 The Problem of What Is Said
Lying, Misleading, and What is Said

Jennifer M. Saul

Oxford University Press

This chapter canvasses current accounts of what is said and related notions, seeking a notion of what is said that can be used to draw the distinction between lying and merely misleading. It argues that no current account is suited to this purpose. This does not mean that these accounts are wrong, as this is not the purpose for which they were formulated. Instead, it means simply that there is a problem to be solved.

Keywords:   lying, misleading, what is said, impliciture, implicature, assertion, explicature, grice, accidental falsehood, completion, expansion

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