Continuant Causation, Fundamentality, and Freedom
Continuant Causation, Fundamentality, and Freedom
In continuant causation the initiator is not an event but a continuant. This paper argues that continuant causation cannot be a fundamental nexus in the world, for two reasons. Firstly, continuants are themselves not fundamental. Secondly, what makes it true that an instance of causation occurs at the time it does? In occurrent causation, temporal parts of the causes and effect themselves are candidate truthmakers. Continuants, however, have no temporal parts, so the only plausible candidates for truthmaker on the cause side are occurrents in which the continuant is involved. That leaves unappetizing choices for the defender of fundamental continuant causation. Either the causal instance is not in time, so the truthmaker question does not arise; or the relevant truth has no truthmaker; or continuant causation is derivative after all.
Keywords: continuant, occurrent, truthmaking, nexus, causation, freedom
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