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Mental Causation and Ontology$
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S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603770

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 March 2021

There is No Exclusion Problem

There is No Exclusion Problem

(p.248) 11 There is No Exclusion Problem
Mental Causation and Ontology

SteinvÖr ThÖll ÁRnadÓttir

Tim Crane

Oxford University Press

Recent discussions of mental causation have been dominated by one or another formulation of the ‘exclusion problem’ for non-reductive views of the mental. Jaegwon Kim and others have argued that a number of apparently plausible principles lead to the conclusion that the mental must either be epiphenomenal or reducible to the physical. This paper disputes the exclusion argument by disputing its central premise—the principle Kim calls the ‘exclusion principle’. It is argued that the exclusion principle is inconsistent with many obvious facts about causation, and that it lacks any convincing argumentative support. Moreover, the principle can be rejected without needing to take a stand on any controversial debates about the nature of causation or the ontology of the mental.

Keywords:   keywords: causal exclusion, exclusion principle, jaegwon kim, mental causation, non-reductivism, ontology

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