Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Mental Causation and Ontology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199603770

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 January 2021

Mental Causation in the Physical World

Mental Causation in the Physical World

(p.58) 3 Mental Causation in the Physical World
Mental Causation and Ontology

Peter Menzies

Oxford University Press

This paper formulates a new argument that seems to show that physicalists must repudiate mental causation. The argument is related to Jaegwon Kim’s Exclusion Argument in that it relies on a crucial exclusion assumption about causation. This paper explores the extent to which this exclusion assumption is supported by different theories of causation. It argues that while a simple counterfactual theory of causation falsifies the assumption in its original form, it actually verifies a more plausible, reformulated version of the assumption under special conditions. The paper draws out some surprising consequences of this result. It argues that far from supporting the new exclusion argument against physicalism, the result actually vindicates the non-reductivist physicalist’s claim that the mental is causally autonomous with respect to the physical. The paper argues, however, that this result imposes constraints on the way in which a non-reductive physicalist can justify the causal autonomy of the mental.

Keywords:   mental causation, jaegwon kim, exclusion argument, non-reductive physicalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .