Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Inquiring MindOn Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jason Baehr

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 October 2020

A Personal Worth Conception of Intellectual Virtue

A Personal Worth Conception of Intellectual Virtue

(p.88) Chapter 6 A Personal Worth Conception of Intellectual Virtue
The Inquiring Mind

Jason Baehr

Oxford University Press

The focus of the book shifts in this chapter to intellectual character and virtue considered in their own right. The present chapter is concemed with specifying the underlying or defining nature of an intellectual virtue. An account is offered according to which the traits in question are intellectual virtues because they contribute to their possessor's “personal intellectual worth,” that is, to their possessor's intellectual goodness or badness qua person. The concepts of personal worth simpliciter and personal intellectual worth are explored at length. It is argued that the basis of personal intellectual worth, and thus of intellectual virtue, is a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods like knowledge and understanding. Finally, the personal worth account is defended against several potential objections.

Keywords:   intellectual virtue, nature of an intellectual virtue, structure of an intellectual virtue, personal intellectual worth

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .