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Modality and Explanatory Reasoning$
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Boris Kment

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604685

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 December 2021

Synopsis

Synopsis

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Synopsis
Source:
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
Author(s):

Boris Kment

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.003.0001

Chapter 1 surveys the main elements of the theory of modality defended in the book: possibility and necessity are matters of degree, and the degree of possibility of a claim P depends on how close (overall similar) the closest P-worlds are to actuality. Closeness to actuality can in turn be analyzed in terms of causation and explanation. Human beings developed the notions of closeness and of possibility and necessity in part because of the utility of these concepts in investigating explanatory relationships by counterfactual reasoning. This cognitive routine is an extension of a procedure for studying causation known as the “method of difference,” which is widely applied in everyday life as well as in scientific experiments. Contrary to a widespread view, modal facts aren’t of much metaphysical interest in their own right, but are important to philosophy mostly because they can serve as evidence about explanatory relationships.

Keywords:   modality, necessity, causation, explanation, counterfactual reasoning, worlds

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