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Modality and Explanatory Reasoning$
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Boris Kment

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199604685

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 07 December 2021

A Theory of Worlds

A Theory of Worlds

(p.113) 5 A Theory of Worlds
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning

Boris Kment

Oxford University Press

Chapter 5 turns the version of linguistic ersatzism proposed in Chapter 4 into a theory of worlds that meets all the demands of the view of necessity defended in the book. That requires an expansion of the Lagadonian language that extends its expressive capacities, which in turn requires a number of further modifications. The revisions have two significant implications for the theory of modality. Firstly, it is impossible in the strictest sense for reality to have certain extreme degrees of complexity or disorderliness, and certain claims about proper classes are necessary in the strictest sense as well. Secondly, worlds aren’t sets but proper classes of Lagadonian sentences, and therefore cannot themselves be members of any classes.

Keywords:   modality, necessity, worlds, linguistic ersatzism, Lagadonian language, proper classes

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