Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophers Past and PresentSelected Essays$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Barry Stroud

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199608591

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 January 2022

The Transparency of ‘Naturalism’

The Transparency of ‘Naturalism’

Chapter:
(p.240) 12 The Transparency of ‘Naturalism’
Source:
Philosophers Past and Present
Author(s):

Barry Stroud

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608591.003.0013

This chapter raises the problem of naturalism's distinctive character. Because the term ‘naturalism’ takes its meaning in each case from what is conceived as falling within the limits of the ‘natural’ world, it is best understood by looking right through the term itself to whatever it is being used to stand for in this or that application. The chapter rehearses some of the dissatisfactions of Humean naturalism and explains how parallel difficulties would undermine any apparently tough-minded naturalism that tries to exclude even intentional attitudes and meaning from the fully ‘natural’ world. That would leave us with no psychological facts, and so not even a conception of the world, to be explained naturalistically or otherwise. In disputes about naturalism, what is in question seems always to be something else, not the merits of naturalism itself.

Keywords:   naturalism, natural world, Hume, intentional attitudes, meaning

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .