Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Friederike Moltmann

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199608744

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608744.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 19 May 2022

Reference to Universals and Plural Reference to Particulars

Reference to Universals and Plural Reference to Particulars

(p.5) 1 Reference to Universals and Plural Reference to Particulars
Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language

Friederike Moltmann

Oxford University Press

This chapter deals with (apparent) reference to universals. A common view is that terms like wisdom and the property of being wise both refer to abstract objects. There is a range of linguistic evidence, however, that this view is mistaken. Bare adjective nominalizations like wisdom have the status of kind terms and as such are best considered terms plurally referring to the various instances. Only the property of being wise is a term referring to an abstract property, but as such it is best viewed as a term that introduces a property on the basis of a corresponding predicate. This chapter also gives an introduction to plural reference and discusses parallels between plural terms and kind terms.

Keywords:   universals, properties, tropes, plural reference, plurals, kinds, kind terms, bare mass nouns, adjective nominalizations

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .