Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

A.W. Price

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199609611

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609611.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 October 2020

Plato on Virtue

Plato on Virtue

(p.84) (p.85) B 1 Plato on Virtue
Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle

A. W. Price

Oxford University Press

In different periods of his writing, Plato argues for different conceptions of the unity of the virtues. He always denies that one can possess one virtue without possessing the others. He first supposes that all virtues are one, since they are identical to knowledge. This goes with an analysis of the emotions that ties them closely to judgements about what in best. In the Republic, he ascribes different emotions to three different ‘parts’ of the soul, and associates distinct virtues with these (with justice as a virtue common to all three). Philosophers possess all these virtues together; even common men who can achieve a virtue only to a limited degree must achieve the other virtues to the same degree. All men can be happy to a degree within Plato’s utopia.

Keywords:   virtue, emotion, unity, part, knowledge, courage, temperance, justice

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .