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Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle$
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A.W. Price

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199609611

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609611.001.0001

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Plato on Practical Reasoning

Plato on Practical Reasoning

(p.148) (p.149) C 1 Plato on Practical Reasoning
Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle

A. W. Price

Oxford University Press

The Lysis contrasts with the ‘first friend’ objects of desire that are only desired hypothetically upon their subserving it; likewise in the Gorgias. The Meno allows that one can desire as good something that in fact is bad. The Republic recognizes non-rational desires that may or may not be acquired in ways that involve reasoning from ends to means. Plato is generally skeptical about the possibility of defining what is virtuous by general principles. Yet he has the aspiration of a method of measurement that would reliably identify the mean, or what is best.

Keywords:   practical, reasoning, inference, good, best, desire, end, means

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