In this chapter I discuss the basic idea of distributed morality (DM), by relying on a comparison with the well-known phenomenon of distributed knowledge in epistemic logic. I explain the difference made by the occurrence of DM by discussing the moral scenario before and after its introduction. Next I provide some elementary examples of DM that should help to illustrate the phenomena in question more vividly and intuitively. I argue that the biggest challenge posed by DM concerns the possibility of harnessing its power in the right way. I outline a theory of morally enabling environment (infraethics) that can facilitate the occurrence and dynamics of DM. I stress that the scope and magnitude of the ethical issues that we are, and will be, facing is such that it requires equally powerful multi-agent systems (MAS) as well as morally enabling environments that are friendly towards, and can facilitate MAS’ distributed morality.
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