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The Ethics of Information$
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Luciano Floridi

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199641321

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641321.001.0001

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The intrinsic value of the infosphere

The intrinsic value of the infosphere

Chapter:
(p.102) 6 The intrinsic value of the infosphere
Source:
The Ethics of Information
Author(s):

Luciano Floridi

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641321.003.0006

In this chapter, I defend the tenability of ecumenical, macroethical e-nvironmentalism. The question I address is this: what is the most general common set of attributes that characterizes something as intrinsically valuable, and hence worthy of some moral respect, and without which something would rightly be considered intrinsically worthless or even positively unworthy of respect? The answer that I develop and support here is that the minimal condition of possibility of an entity’s least intrinsic value is to be identified with its ontological status as an informational entity. All entities, when interpreted as clusters of information—when our ontology is developed at an informational level of abstraction—have a minimal moral worth qua informational entities and so may deserve to be respected. This is IE’s axiological ecumenism.

Keywords:   object-oriented model, axiology, Kant, ontology

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