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Locke's Metaphysics$
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Matthew Stuart

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199645114

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645114.001.0001

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Agency: The Revised Account

Agency: The Revised Account

(p.443) 10 Agency: The Revised Account
Locke's Metaphysics

Matthew Stuart

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores changes in Locke's philosophy of action as it is presented in the second and later editions of the Essay. He settles on a single account of volition, and emphasizes the narrow scope of volition. He also offers a new account of motivation, one on which people are moved by present uneasiness rather than the prospect of future good. Locke's remarks about the suspension of the prosecution of desires are common sense observations, not philosophical theory. He also does not take a clear stand on the issue of whether human actions are governed by causal determinism.

Keywords:   volition, motivation, uneasiness, suspension, determinism

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