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Locke's Metaphysics$
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Matthew Stuart

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199645114

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645114.001.0001

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(p.339) 8 Persons
Locke's Metaphysics

Matthew Stuart

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines Locke's account of personal identity, beginning with his definition of a person as a rational being that can consider itself as the same self over time. The main business of the chapter is to argue that Locke defends the simple memory theory, according to which an event belongs to a person's past just in case the person remembers it in a certain first-personal way. This is to be distinguished from a theory that requires memory continuity for diachronic personal identity. The chapter explores Locke's account of what it is to remember, and his resources for defending the simple memory theory against objections.

Keywords:   person, personal identity, memory, simple memory theory, memory continuity

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