Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism
Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism
A number of authors—for example Fraser MacBride, Ted Sider, Katherine Hawley, and myself—have recently discussed the issue of the metaontology of the neo-Fregeanism of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright. Underlying these discussions is the assumption that behind the neo-Fregeans’ reliance on Hume’s Principle to justify their version of platonist logicism lies some sort of reliance on a general conception of ontological questions. In a recent article, Hale and Wright respond, claiming that the commentators’ discussions in various ways misconstrue their views. I here discuss Hale and Wright’s response, stressing the substantive questions, relevant to the fate of the neo-Fregean project, that I see their discussion as leaving unresolved.
Keywords: neo-Fregeanism, Hume’s principle, abstraction principles, platonism, logicism, Bob Hale, Crispin Wright
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