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Meaning and Normativity$
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Allan Gibbard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199646074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.001.0001

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Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Meaning

Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Meaning

Chapter:
(p.53) 3 Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Meaning
Source:
Meaning and Normativity
Author(s):

Allan Gibbard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.003.0003

Chapter 2, one might complain, departs from Kripke’s “skeptical solution” and seems un-Wittgensteinian in spirit, but it accommodates the considerations that lead to Kripke’s paradox, with examples that clarify its structure. The case in Chapter 2 is extended and analysed. Kripke rejects appeals to simplicity for questions of meaning, but these parallel legitimate appeals in scientific cases. Knowing one’s dispositions couldn’t show me mistaken, Kripke argues. It could, though, indicate, as a normative matter, that one is departing from what one’s proclivities justify. Kripke’s skeptical solution is unnecessary: In judging meanings, we don’t just observe the community; we join in and make the same sorts of meaning judgments as members do, on like bases. These are judgments of truth and not just of assertability, pace Kripke’s Wittgenstein, since what’s assertable with full information is true.

Keywords:   meaning, skeptical solution, simplicity, scientific method, dispositions, community, truth, assertability

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