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Meaning and Normativity$
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Allan Gibbard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199646074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 26 January 2022

Horwich on Meaning

Horwich on Meaning

(p.92) 5 Horwich on Meaning
Meaning and Normativity

Allan Gibbard

Oxford University Press

Paul Horwich’s naturalistic theory of meaning expounded here happily eschews an unexplained notion of truth conditions. Meanings he explains via synonymy and deflation, with synonymy treated naturalistically. Context dependence, though, requires explaining coreference, so that truth and reference work correspondingly. Ideal use is on a par with truth in the explanatory burdens assumed. Horwich’s problem is to identify the role of meaning in psychology; meaning must be whatever plays this meaning role. As with many scientific explanations, Horwich’s idealizes, but multiple idealizations may be explanatory and ascribe different meanings. This Quine-like indeterminacy of meaning is illustrated by Newton’s and Einstein’s theories of mass. Oughts might remove some of this indeterminacy. Horwich explains some meanings with Ramsey sentences and Carnap conditionals, which is taken here as normative. Lessons are drawn that will apply to the book’s project.

Keywords:   Horwich, meaning, truth conditions, synonymy, deflation, coreference, meaning role, indeterminacy of meaning, conditionals

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