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Meaning and Normativity$
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Allan Gibbard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199646074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.001.0001

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Meaning and Plans

Meaning and Plans

(p.169) 8 Meaning and Plans
Meaning and Normativity

Allan Gibbard

Oxford University Press

This chapter joins the previous normative metatheory of meaning, which was couched in terms of Ewing’s primitive ought, to expressivism for this ought. Ought beliefs are treated as something like restrictions on plans. Differences between “plans” in this sense and in the ordinary sense are surveyed. Linguistic interpretation establishes synonymy, and synonymy beliefs are states of planning. A normative isomorphism matches two kinds of plans: for accepting sentences of one’s own, and for accepting, as the subject in light of her linguistic dispositions, sentences in her language. These plans are for epistemic circumstances and under suppositions. The chapter explains what both these kinds of plans amount to, with the recurring example of what a Newtonian means by ‘mass’.

Keywords:   expressivism, normative, metatheory of meaning, plans, interpretation, epistemic

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