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Meaning and Normativity$
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Allan Gibbard

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199646074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 26 January 2022

Interpreting Interpretation

Interpreting Interpretation

Chapter:
(p.193) 9 Interpreting Interpretation
Source:
Meaning and Normativity
Author(s):

Allan Gibbard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646074.003.0009

The metatheory of the book is tested in application to itself. What sorts of plans must one have to believe the metatheory, and do we have such plans? The structure of the metatheory is like that of Brandom. Moore claimed that normative thoughts aren’t naturalistic. The metatheory says what kinds of planning constitute believing Moore, and the metatheory itself. An objection from weakness of will: one can believe one must do something but not do it. The expressivist point is that such a state of mind suffers conceptual incoherence. Nonnaturalism too can recognize this. With conceptually incoherent states of mind, a different concept of mental content from that in the book is needed, grounded in simulation. Simulational meaning allows interpreting a person as conceptually confused, whereas normative meaning figures in what one could believe coherently.

Keywords:   metatheory, naturalistic, planning, weakness of will, conceptual incoherence, expressivism, nonnaturalism, simulation

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