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Foundations of Metacognition$
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Michael J. Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner, and Joëlle Proust

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199646739

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.001.0001

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Metacognition and indicative conditionals: a précis

Metacognition and indicative conditionals: a précis

(p.252) Chapter 15 Metacognition and indicative conditionals: a précis
Foundations of Metacognition

Hannes Leitgeb

Oxford University Press

This chapter defends the thesis that accepting an indicative conditional is a metacognitive process that is not metarepresentational. The argument that we give in favour of this thesis is based on (1) the suppositional theory of conditionals, (2) David Lewis’ triviality result on probabilities of conditionals, and (3) Joelle Proust’s account of metacognition. The chapter ends with a list of open questions that we aim to turn to in a more comprehensive study of metacognition and conditionals.

Keywords:   indicative conditionals, metacognition, metarepresentation, suppositional theory, probabilistic Ramsey test, acceptance, simulation

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