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From Morality to MetaphysicsThe Theistic Implications of our Ethical Commitments$
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Angus Ritchie

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199652518

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 December 2021

Procedures and Reasons

Procedures and Reasons

Tim Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard

(p.90) 4 Procedures and Reasons
From Morality to Metaphysics

Angus Ritchie

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers the changing account of moral ontology offered by Timothy Scanlon, arguing it exemplifies the dilemma which the book has argued all secular theories will face. It begins by arguing that Scanlon's early position avoids the metaphysical commitments which generate the ‘explanatory gap’ at the price of being unable to vindicate the ‘deliberatively indispensable’ ethical commitments defended in Chapter 1. Because Scanlon draws heavily on Christine Korsgaard for his meta-ethical account, the chapter will considers of her ‘procedural moral realism’, arguing it shares the fundamental flaws of quasi-realism. It then evaluates the more objectivist position developed in Scanlon's 2009 John Locke Lectures. While this position avoids the problems faced by Blackburn, Gibbard, and Korsgaard, the chapter argues that it does so at the price of generating the explanatory gap.

Keywords:   constructivism, Scanlon, Korsgaard, procedural moral realism, moral objectivism

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