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Self-Knowledge for Humans$
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Quassim Cassam

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199657575

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.001.0001

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Looking Inwards

Looking Inwards

(p.122) 10 Looking Inwards
Self-Knowledge for Humans

Quassim Cassam

Oxford University Press

The idea that we acquire self-knowledge by some form of inner perception has been recommended on the basis that it is well placed to account for the immediacy of self-knowledge. Boghossian and Shoemaker develop versions of a neo-Humean argument against the perceptual model, but this argument is not decisive, at least on the assumption that genuine perception can involve inference. Nevertheless, there are good reasons not to model introspection on object perception. Armstrong’s ‘broad’ perceptual model of introspection bypasses objections to the object perception model, but should still be rejected, since it implies that, epistemologically and phenomenologically, introspection is fundamentally no different from clairvoyance as BonJour understands it. The broad perceptual model is also ill-equipped to account for substantial self-knowledge.

Keywords:   inner perception, immediacy, Paul Boghossian, Sydney Shoemaker, neo-Humean argument, object perception model, introspection, D. M. Armstrong, broad perceptual model, Laurence BonJour

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