The idea that we acquire self-knowledge by some form of inner perception has been recommended on the basis that it is well placed to account for the immediacy of self-knowledge. Boghossian and Shoemaker develop versions of a neo-Humean argument against the perceptual model, but this argument is not decisive, at least on the assumption that genuine perception can involve inference. Nevertheless, there are good reasons not to model introspection on object perception. Armstrong’s ‘broad’ perceptual model of introspection bypasses objections to the object perception model, but should still be rejected, since it implies that, epistemologically and phenomenologically, introspection is fundamentally no different from clairvoyance as BonJour understands it. The broad perceptual model is also ill-equipped to account for substantial self-knowledge.
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