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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification$
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Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199658343

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 April 2021

On Epistemic Entitlement (II)

On Epistemic Entitlement (II)

Welfare State Epistemology*

(p.213) 11 On Epistemic Entitlement (II)
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification

Crispin Wright

Oxford University Press

Entitlement, as here understood, is a kind of rational ground to accept a proposition that consists neither in the possession of evidence for its truth, nor in the occurrence of any kind of cognitive achievement that would normally be regarded as apt to constitute knowledge of it. In earlier work the chapter argues for the possibility of using such a notion to fashion a unified response to two of the most traditional and disturbing forms of sceptical paradox. The present chapter further explores the potential epistemological significance of entitlements, suggests some refinements of the chapter’s earlier proposals, reassesses the prototype of entitlement derivable from Hans Reichenbach’s ideas about the justification of induction, argues that entitlements are indeed properly viewed as epistemic warrants, and responds to a number of objections and difficulties for the chapter’s proposals which have surfaced in the recent literature.

Keywords:   alchemy, conservatism, entitlement, hinge propositions, leaching, liberalism, Reichenbach, H., scepticism

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