Moderatism, Transmission Failures, Closure, and Humean Scepticism*
Moderatism, Transmission Failures, Closure, and Humean Scepticism*
In this chapter an intermediate position between Jim Pryor’s liberal conception of the architecture of empirical warrants and Crispin Wright’s conservative view is presented. The main tenets of such a view, called ‘moderatism’, are presented and its consequences with respect to failure of warrant transmission explored. It is then claimed that moderatism allows one to countenance a second kind of transmission failure, different from Wright’s original variety of it. The bearing of such a view on the issue of the cogency of Moore’s proof and on the Principle of Closure for warrant is investigated. Finally, moderatism, developed along ‘internal rationalist’ lines, is brought to bear on the issue of Humean scepticism, and it is claimed that it represents a better solution to it than Wright’s appeal to the notion of entitlement.
Keywords: Closure Principle, Conservativism, entitlement, Humean scepticism, internal rationalism, liberalism, moderatism, perception, transmission-failure 1&2, warrant
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