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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification$
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Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199658343

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 April 2021

Consciousness, Attention, and Justification*

Consciousness, Attention, and Justification*

(p.149) 8 Consciousness, Attention, and Justification*
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification

Susanna Siegel

Nicholas Silins

Oxford University Press

This chapter is about the role in epistemology of consciousness outside attention. In Section 1 the chapter argues that we are indeed sometimes conscious of entities to which we do not attend, as when you remember you saw something you did not notice at the time. In Section 2 the chapter makes a case for the view that consciousness outside attention gives us reasons for belief. In Section 3 the chapter responds to the case against its view. In the conclusion, the chapter surveys the upshots of the issue for traditional debates about ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ in epistemology.

Keywords:   attention, change blindness, consciousness, externalism, inattentional blindness, internalism, obligation, perceptual justification, permission

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